West Valley City v. Teresa Foy : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2003
West Valley City v. Teresa Foy : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J Richard Catten; Attorney for Appe;;ee.
Stephen G homer; Attprney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, West Valley City v. Foy, No. 20030503 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4399
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





Docket No. 2003-0503 
Priority 15 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
The Honorable Pat B Brian, District Judge 
STEPHEN G HOMER 
Attorney at Law 
9225 South Redwood Road 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
Attorney for Appellant 
TERESA FOY 
J RICHARD CATTEN 
Attorney at Law 
West Valley City Corporation 
3 600 South Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
Attorney for Appellee 
WEST VALLEY CITY 
Wah Court of Appeals 
NOV 2 5 2003 
Pa
"teaeStagg 
Clerk of the Court 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WEST VALLEY CITY, ) 
) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Plaintiff-Appellee ) 
v s : . . . • • . , .•;. . ) 
TERESA FOY, ) Case NO. 2003-0503 
Defendant-Appellant ) ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
DESIGNATION OF THE PARTIES 
The Plaintiff-Appellee WEST VALLEY CITY is a Utah 
municipal corporation. The Defendant-Appellant TERESA 
FOY is a natural person. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DESIGNATION OF THE PARTIES . . . i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES i 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 6 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 11 
ARGUMENT 12 
1. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE 
PLAINTIFF WAS INAPPROPRIATE 
A. GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
SHOULD HAVE PRECLUDED 
THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF MUNICIPALITY 
12 
• • • • • • • • • • -i- <Ci 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
B. THE CITY'S FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY COMPLY 
WITH PERTINENT PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
ESTOPS THE CITY FROM ASSERTING 
THE FACTS ARE NOT IN GENUINE DISPUTE 
29 
2. CITY'S FAILURE TO FOLLOW ITS OWN 
ORDINANCES [CONCERNING THE GRANTING 
OF THE REQUESTED "HEARING"] 
PRECLUDES SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF THE CITY 
31 
3. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED 
IN OSTENSIBLY IMPOSING 
PERSONAL LIABILITY UPON DEFENDANT FOY 
FOR THE CLAIMED VIOLATIONS 
ON THE SOUTHERN PARCEL 
OWNED BY THE CORPORATE ENTITY 
BY REASON OF HER "DIRECTOR" STATUS 
WITH THAT CORPORATION 
35 
4. THE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, 
AS WELL AS THIS JUDICIAL PROCEEDING 
SEEKING ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION, IS INVALID 
INASMUCH AS IT CONTRAVENES THE EXPRESS PROVISIONS 
OF SECTION 10-11-1 ET SEQ, UTAH CODE 
44 
5. TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF "WRONGFUL LIEN" 
COUNTERCLAIM WAS IMPROPER DUE TO 
GENUINE DISPUTE AS TO FACT 
48 
CONCLUSION 49 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 51 
ADDENDA 
EXHIBIT 1: 25 October 1997 REQUEST FOR HEARING 
EXHIBIT 2: 24 Nov 1997 FOY letter 
EXHIBIT 3: DEFENDANT'S Requests for Admissions 
EXHIBIT 4: CITY'S Responses to discovery requests 
EXHIBIT 5. Section 10-11-1, Utah Code 
EXHIBIT 6: WEST VALLEY CITY "CODE ENFORCEMENT" 
ORDINANCES 
EXHIBIT 7. District Court "Memorandum Decision" 
EXHIBIT 8. District Court "Summary Judgment" Order Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases cited 
Allstate Insurance Company vs Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Group, 868 P.d 110, 112 (Utah 
Court of Appeals 1994) 4, 5 
Bennion vs Graham Resources, Incorporated, 
849 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah 1993) 5 
Commercial Union Associates vs Clayton, 
863 P.2d 29 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993) . . . . 5 
Harding vs Alpine City, 
656 P.2d 985 (Utah Supreme Court 1982) . . . 46, 47 
Hebertson vs Bank One, Utah, N.A., 
1999 UT APP 34 (Utah Court of Appeals 1999). 13, 14 
Herr vs Salt Lake County, 
525 P. 2d 728 (Utah Supreme Court 1974) 34 
Higgins vs Salt Lake County, 
855 P. 2d 231 (Utah Supreme Court 1993) 5 
Howell vs Howell, 
806 P.2d 1209 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993) . . . 6 
Kasco Services Corporation vs Benson, 
831 P.2d 86 (Utah Supreme Court 1992) 4 
McMahan vs Dees, 
873 P.2d 1172 (Utah Court of Appeals 1994) . . . 4 
Ong International (U.S.A.), Incorporated vs 11th 
Avenue Corporation, 850 P.2d 447 
(Utah Supreme Court 1993) 5 
Provo River Water Users' Association vs 
Morgan, 857 P.2d 927 (Utah Supreme Court 1993) . 5 
Sanders vs Ovard, 
838 P.2d 1134 (Utah Supreme Court 1992) . . . . 5 
Society of Separationists, Inc. vs Taggart, 
862 P.2d 1339 (Utah Supreme Court 1993) . . . . 4 
Springville Citizens for a Better Community vs 
City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 332 
(Utah Supreme Court 1999) 21 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Stratton vs West States Construction, 
21 Utah 2d 60, 440 P.2d 111 (Utah Supreme Court 
1968) 41 
United Park City Mines Company vs Greater Park 
City Company, 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah Supreme 
Court 1993) 4 
Wade vs Stangl, 
869 P.2d 9 (Utah Court of Appeals 1994) . . . . 4 
West Valley City vs Roberts, 
1999 UT APP 358, 993 P.2d 252 (Utah Court of 
Appeals 1999) 34, 35 
Statutes cited 
Section 10-11-1, Utah Code . . . 3, 44, 45, 46, 50 
Section 16-I0a-302, Utah Code 42 
Section 57-1-13, Utah Code 43 
Section 63-46b-19, Utah Code . . . . 2, 10, 28, 29 
Section 78-2a-3 (2) (j ) , Utah Code 1 
Other authorities 
18B Am Jur 2d, "Corporations", §1829 . . . . 40, 41 
West Valley City Municipal Code: 
Section 1-1-102 33 
Section 1-1-109 . . 33, 34 
Section 10-1-110 14, 27 
Section 10-1-202 42 
Section 10-2-102 . . . 17 
Section 10-2-103 20 
Section 10-2-501 . 19, 20 
Section 10-2-503 32, 33 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
Jurisdiction of this Court is granted pursuant to 
the provision of Section 78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah Code, and 
pursuant to the "pour over" Order of the Utah Supreme 
Court entered in this case. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This appeal and the predicate factual and legal 
situation in which is arose present the following 
issues: 
1. Whether the District Court erred in 
granting summary judgment when (1) there were 
genuine issues of material fact before the 
Court which should have precluded such summary 
judgment and (2) the Plaintiff WEST VALLEY 
CITY ["the CITY"] did not show it was, as a 
matter of law, entitled to judgment. 
2. Whether the CITY, admitting that it 
received the "request for hearing" document in 
a timely manner, can ignore and disregard the 
mandatory provisions and requirements of its 
own ordinances and procedures, by failing to 
provide the requested "hearing". 
3. Whether the District Court properly ruled 
in favor of the City and against Defendant FOY 
when there were genuine issues of fact in 
1 
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dispute as to whether the observed violations 
were actually upon her parcel. 
4. Whether the District Court, by ruling 
within the factually-disputed issue concerning 
the "request for hearing" and the Defendant's 
claimed (by the Court, but not necessarily by 
the CITY) "failure to exhaust her 
administrative remedies" that she had not 
requested a hearing, violated the provisions 
of Section 63-46-19(3), Utah Code, concerning 
the "defenses" allowed to Defendant FOY. 
5. Whether the District Court erred in 
denying the Defendant an opportunity for trial 
on the basis that she had "failed to exhaust 
her administrative remedies" when she had, in 
fact and in law, fully complied with the 
municipal ordinances applicable to the 
"request for hearing", that she had acted 
through her agent in timely requesting the 
"hearing", had clothed that agent with 
"apparent authority" to act in her behalf, and 
it was the City, in disregard of its own 
ordinances, which failed to hold the 
previously-scheduled "hearing", ostensibly out 
of fear of improperly disregarding her 
2 
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"rights" (so the City assessed the full 
amounts of "fines" against her). 
6. Whether or not the District Court erred 
in granting summary judgment when the CITY 
failed to abide by the clearly applicable 
provisions of Section 10-11-1, Utah Code 
[pertaining to the duties of local enforcement 
officers in cases of debris and clutter], 
including but not limited to the fact that the 
City incurred "no clean-up expense" because 
the CITY did not clean-up the parcel, as the 
statute requires. 
7. Whether the municipality is bound by the 
limitations and restrictions clearly imposed 
by the provisions of state statute [Section 
10-11-1 et seq, Utah Code] and must abide by 
such provisions, or whether generalized vague 
and ambiguous "enabling legislation" 
authorizing enforcement actions against 
"nuisances" (not necessarily so characterized 
in the municipal ordinances) may trump the 
more detailed and dispositive provisions of 
state statute. 
8. Whether or not the District Court erred 
in holding the Defendant personally liable for 
3 
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the debts of a validly-formed and -operating 
corporation when the Defendant natural person 
was merely a "director" of said corporation 
which owned the parcel upon which the majority 
of the alleged violations occurred. 
9. Whether the 1998 "Notice" document 
recorded by the County was a "wrongful lien" 
as proscribed by Section 38-11-901 et seq, 
Utah Code, and whether issues of fact 
precluded the District Court from granting 
summary judgment in the municipality's favor 
on that issue. 
For each of the foregoing "legal" issues identified 
above, the "standard of review" for the appellate court 
in this case is as follows: 
A trial court's conclusions of law in civil cases 
are reviewed for correctness. United Park City Mines 
Company vs Greater Park City Company, 870 P.2d 880, 885 
(Utah Supreme Court 1993); Society of Separationists, 
Inc. vs Taggart, 862 P.2d 1339, 1341 (Utah Supreme 
Court 1993); Kasco Services Corporation vs Benson, 831 
P.2d 86, 89 (Utah Supreme Court 1992); McMahan vs Dees, 
873 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Utah Court of Appeals 1994); Wade 
vs Stangl, 869 P. 2d 9, 12 (Utah Court of Appeals 
1994) ; Allstate Insurance Company vs Liberty Mutual 
4 
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Insurance Group, 868 P.2d 111, 112 (Utah Court of 
Appeals 1994) . 
Whether the trial court properly interpreted (or 
applied) a statute is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. Ong International (U.S.A.), Incorporated 
vs 11th Avenue Corporation, 850 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah 
Supreme Court 19 93); Bennion vs Graham Resources, 
Incorporated, 849 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah 1993); Jacobsen 
Investment Company vs State Tax Commission, 83 9 P.2d 
789, 790 (Utah Supreme Court 1992). 
This standard of review has also been referred to 
as a "correction of error standard". Jacobsen 
Investment Company vs State Tax Commission, 83 9 P. 2d 
789, 790 (Utah Supreme Court 1992); Sanders vs Ovard, 
838 P.2d 1134, 1135 (Utah Supreme Court 1992); 
Commercial Union Associates vs Clayton, 863 P. 2d 29, 36 
(Utah Court of Appeals 1993) . "Correction of error" 
means that no particular deference is given to the 
trial court's ruling on questions of law. Provo River 
Water Users' Association vs Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 931 
(Utah Supreme Court 1993); Higgins vs Salt Lake County, 
855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah Supreme Court 1993). The 
"correction of error" standard means that the appellate 
court decides the matter for itself and does not defer 
in any degree to the trial judge's determination of 
5 
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law. Howell vs Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Court 
of Appeals 1993) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In September 1997 the Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY 
[hereinafter "the CITY"] adopted ordinances to 
establish and implement a "code enforcement program". 
Approximately 35 days later in October 1997 CITY 
code enforcement officers allegedly observed numerous 
items of debris, junk, deleterious objects, and other 
"clutter" upon what those officers believed albeit 
INCORRECTLY to be a single parcel, owned by the 
Defendant-Appellant TERESA FOY. [In actuality, of the 
SIX claimed violations, fully FOUR thereof were upon 
the Lancer, Incorporated parcel. A fifth violation was 
upon both parcels. And the sixth violation was upon 
only the FOY parcel.] At times material hereto, 
Defendant FOY was the sole owner of a 0.15-acre parcel 
of real estate, located at 3247 West 3650 South, West 
Valley City and upon which was located a single-family 
residential dwelling. The dimensions of the "FOY 
parcel" are approximately 64 feet in the east-west 
direction and 104 feet in the north-south dimension. 
Plaintiff's Complaint, %3. RECORD at 000002. [Unknown 
to CITY personnel at the time of the observed 
violations but made known to them shortly thereafter-
6 
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--was the legal existence and status of a second 
parcel, the "LANCER, INCORPORATED parcel immediately 
south of the "FOY parcel".] 
As required by City ordinance the code enforcement 
officers prepared and caused to be mailed to Defendant 
FOY, then residing in Blanding, Utah, a "notice of 
violation" directing her to clean up the clutter on her 
(sic) parcel and notifying her of her "right" to 
request "a hearing" on the matter. Plaintiff's 
Complaint, 115 Plaintiff's Complaint. RECORD at 000002. 
In response to the "notice" mailed to her, Defendant 
FOY contacted her husband Jim Decker who, with 
others, were occupying the Foy parcel (and the Lancer, 
Incorporated parcel) as tenants thereon. Mr Decker and 
others were in fact responsible for the clutter and 
zoning violations ostensibly identified by the CITY. Mr 
Decker caused a letter to be prepared which requested 
"a hearing", as follows: 
October 25, 1997 
to: Administrative Hearing Coordinator 
City of West Valley 
Ordinance Enforcement Office 
3600 South Consitutuion Blv. 
West Valley, Utah 84119 
re: case # 97-5215 
from: Renter K Cooper 
3247 West 3650 South 
West Valley, Utah 84119 
7 
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Dear Sirs, 
Please schedual a hearing as to the above. 
Request: 1. That the ordinance officer who 
issued the citation be present at the hearing. 
2. That the officer be available for 
minor questions, discussion. 
The landlady, of this particular property, 
resides in distance South Eastern, Utah. She 
has made it very clear that she will have no 
envolement whatsoever. Furtherwell, she 
expects this matter to be handle between us 
here in West Valley City, directives should be 
sent to the renter at the above address. 
The Landlady's only wish: to be informed "once 
and only once" of the clearance/resolution of 
these charges. 
Could a complete copy of the citation as well 
as excerpts of the city code cited as 
violations be mailed? We will be expecting a 
letter directly from the City Ordinance, soon. 
Thank you. 
Emphasis added. Spelling errors in original. RECORD at 
000055. A photocopy of the "request for hearing", dated 
showing receipt by the CITY, is found at ATTACHMENT 1 
to this APPELLANT'S BRIEF.] The letter was properly 
addressed to the specified person, was timely mailed 
with proper postage affixed to the envelope, and was 
ACTUALLY RECEIVED by the City, BEFORE the stated 
deadline. 
Although Ms FOY's husband (Mr Decker) stated the 
CITY originally scheduled a "hearing" as requested, the 
CITY claims no hearing was scheduled. [The CITY does 
not dispute that a case file was "opened" against Mr 
8 
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Decker albeit against the "corporate parcel" on 
December 1st (1997); the hearing on Mr Decker's case 
was held on December 8th a mere five days later! See 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES DECKER. RECORD at 000091-000095. The 
CITY has offered no credible explanation for the 
apparent discrepancy that the "Jim Decker case" was 
opened and proceeded to "hearing" in as short a period 
as seven days, when the municipal ordinance grants to 
the propertyowner a ten-day period in which to request 
"a hearing". Furthermore, the CITY has been unable to 
produce a written "request for hearing" on the "Jim 
Decker case", nor do the City's records contain such a 
"written request".] 
Although the CITY acknowledged that the original 
"Request for Hearing" letter referred to the property 
address correctly, the stated "case number", and that 
the owner lived in southern Utah and had requested the 
on-site persons to handle the matter with the City, the 
City "did nothing" with the "request for hearing". 
Eventually, a hearing officer ostensibly as a result 
of ex parte communications from Code Enforcement 
personnel assessed almost $7,000 in "administrative 
fines" against the Defendant TERESA FOY for the alleged 
six violations allegedly observed upon her parcel. 
Shortly thereafter the CITY filed with the Salt 
9 
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Lake County Recorder a "Notice of Viola t ion" descr ib ing 
the a l leged v i o l a t i o n s and the fac t s and processes 
which had r e s u l t e d in the assessment of the 
admin i s t r a t ive "f ines" agains t the FOY p a r c e l . 
When the City was unable to c o l l e c t the "f ines" i t s 
"hearing of f ice r" had assessed, the CITY i n s t i t u t e d the 
j u d i c i a l ac t ion in the Third D i s t r i c t Court, West 
Valley Department, to obta in a c i v i l judgment to 
c o l l e c t those " f i n e s " . 1 
The Defendant responded to the c i v i l ac t ion by 
pleading numerous fac tua l and l ega l defenses to the 
CITY'S pleaded cla ims. Ul t imately , the Defendant f i l e d 
a counterclaim aga ins t the CITY for the CITY'S f i l i n g 
of a "wrongful l i en" aga ins t her p a r c e l . [In the course 
of the l i t i g a t i o n , the D i s t r i c t Court holding tha t 
the recorded documents were not a " l ien" granted 
p a r t i a l summary judgment in favor of the City on the 
xThe instant judicial action, filed in the Dis t r ic t Court for 
the so-pleaded singular purpose of obtaining a "judgment" to 
collect the "administrative fines" imposed by the Administrative 
Hearing Officer, contravenes the prohibition found in Section 63-
46b-19(2)(c), Utah Code, which provides: 
(c) Except to the extent expressly authorized by 
s ta tute , a complaint seeking c iv i l enforcement of an 
agency's order may not request, and the court may not 
grant, any monetary payment apart from taxable costs. 
Emphasis added. Coupled with the proscriptions and limitations 
imposed upon the CITY by the provisions of Section 10-11-1 et seq, 
Utah Code, pertaining to the procedures to be followed by the CITY, 
the foregoing limitation arguably precludes the action altogether. 
The "judgment" prepared by the CITY'S counsel and entered by 
the Distr ict Court does not award any monetary payment to the CITY, 
even though such was sought in the i n i t i a l pleadings. 
10 
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counterclaim.] RECORD at 000406-000409. 
In May 2003 the District Court entered an Order 
granting the CITY'S Motion for Summary Judgment. RECORD 
at 000714-000716. This appeal ensued. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Defendants' arguments are summarized as follows: 
1. Summary Judgment in favor of the 
Plaintiff was inappropriately granted due to 
the genuine dispute of material fact: 
particularly, Defendant FOY did, in fact, 
request a hearing albeit through her 
authorized agents. 
2. The City should be estopped to assert the 
facts are not in genuine dispute due to its 
own intentional failure to meaningfully 
respond to the Defendant's "pre-trial 
discovery" efforts. 
3. The City's failure to abide by the 
"mandatory" provisions of its own ordinances 
(to grant a hearing) precludes successful 
judicial action in this case. 
4. The District Court erred in granting 
Summary Judgment against Defendant FOY for all 
of the claimed violation when CITY witnesses 
had previously testified under oath that only 
11 
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a portion of the "violations" were located 
upon the FOY parcel. 
5. The District Court erred in holding 
Defendant FOY personally responsible for the 
corporate "violations" because she was a 
director of that corporation. 
6. The provisions of the CITY'S "code 
enforcement ordinances" violate the detailed 
and specific provisions of Section 10-11-1 et 
seq, Utah Code, pertaining to the duties of 
cities in cases of "weedy lots", etc. 
7. The District Court erred in prematurely 
dismissing the Defendant's counterclaim on the 
"wrongful lien" issues. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF 
WAS INAPPROPRIATE 
A 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT SHOULD HAVE PRECLUDED 
THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF MUNICIPALITY 
The CITY, on numerous occasions, sought "summary 
judgment" in its favor on the basis that the Defendant 
FOY had failed to request a "hearing" before the 
Administrative Hearing Officer. Such statements that 
Defendant FOY did "not request a hearing" are 
12 
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incorrect, misleading and constitute a "play on words", 
advanced in self-serving fashion by Plaintiff CITY and 
its counsel to justify the municipality's FAILURE TO 
COMPLY WITH ITS OWN ORDINANCES. 
The CITY, claiming to have ignored the timely-filed 
"K Cooper request for hearing"2, seeks to justify its 
actions (ala inaction) by focusing upon the "agency" 
(or claimed lack thereof) of "Renter K Cooper". That 
disingenuous analysis and position is materially flawed 
and the District Court should have neither countenanced 
nor implicitly accepted that argument. 
The correct analysis should focus upon the FACT 
THAT A HEARING WAS REQUESTED, ON THE PROPERTY IN 
QUESTION, CONCERNING THE VERY VIOLATIONS AT ISSUE, BY 
A PERSON WHO WAS ARGUABLY A "RESPONSIBLE PERSON" AND 
WHO CLAIMED TO HAVE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY TO ACT 
FOR DEFENDANT TERESA FOY! 
In Hebertson vs Bank One, Utah, N^A. 1999 UT App 
342, %2, 995 P. 2d 7 (quoting Parker vs Dodgion, 971 
P.2d 496, 496-497 (Utah Supreme Court 1998), the Court 
of Appeals wrote: 
2See AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES DECKER, RECORD at 000091-00095, 
which claims that the CITY initially scheduled a "hearing" on 
the "Teresa Foy parcel", but "switched" the hearing to the 
newly-opened "case" [involving the "Jim Decker (ala Lancer, 
Inc.) parcel] only SEVEN DAYS AFTER that case was originally 
opened! 
13 
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"In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, 
[the appellate court] considers the facts in 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
1999 UT App 342 at 1J2 . Emphasis added. 
The so-called "agency issue" (of K Cooper, to act 
for FOY) might be meritorious and legally significant 
IF the CITY were attempting to hold Defendant FOY 
liable for the acts of the "agent" selected by her. 
Such is NOT the case here! On the contrary: the CITY is 
trying to OVERLOOK ITS OWN FAILURES in NOT granting a 
"hearing" on a hypertechnical argument, advanced in 
"bad faith" and contrary to its own procedures and 
policies, as embodied within its own ordinances. 
The "administrative code enforcement" [A.C.E.] 
program is governed by the provisions of Title 10 of 
the CITY'S "Municipal Code". Section 10-1-110 of the 
CITY'S "Municipal Code", pertaining to "definitions" 
applicable to the "code enforcement program", provides 
as follows: 
(19) "Property Owner" means the record 
owner of real property based on the County 
Assessor's records. 
(21) "Responsible Person" means a person 
the City determines is responsible for causing 
or maintaining a violation of the City Codes 
or applicable state codes. The term 
"Responsible Person" includes, but is not 
limited to, a property owner, tenant, person 
with a legal interest in real property, or 
person in possession of real property. 
14 
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Emphasis added. [Arguably, the first sentence 
contemplates some kind of adjudicative process by which 
the "City determines [the person to be] responsible for 
. . . a violation". Thus, Renter K Cooper could if 
the City chose to approach it in this fashion be 
deemed to be "a responsible person". Thus, his "request 
for hearing" is facially valid and should have been 
honored. That the City purports to find persons OTHER 
THAN PROPERTYOWNERS to be "responsible persons" is 
confirmed by the "administrative order" entered in "the 
Jim Decker case" [A.C.E. case # 97-6058, in which 
Teresa Foy was found INCORRECTLY, nevertheless to 
be the "owner" of the parcel (i.e. "the Lancer parcel") 
but James Decker was found to be "the responsible 
person", against whom the administrative order was 
entered and upon which the City ultimately took a civil 
judgment ultimately satisfied in the Third District 
Court.3] 
Thus, within the "four corners" of the "request for 
3The judgment taken by the CITY and later satisfied 
should constitute a "res judicata" and/or "collateral 
estoppel" defense, as such involved the very same parcel (the 
Lancer parcel) , the very same claimed violations, and the very 
same time. 
For this new defense which was not available to Defendant 
TERESA FOY at the time she filed her original "answer", she 
has concurrently filed a motion for leave to amend to file an 
amended answer, to incorporate the "collateral estoppel" 
defense now available to her. 
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hearing" document [i.e. the "K Cooper letter"], the 
writer thereof has affirmatively stated his source of 
authority (i.e. his "agency", as we are now describing 
it): namely, the landlady wants us (here in Salt Lake 
County) to handle the problem and deal with West Valley 
City. In the "request for hearing" he recites 
information (dates, property address, WVC case file 
number, the request itself, and so forth) WHICH COULD 
BE KNOWN ONLY BY A PERSON WITH WHOM DEFENDANT TERESA 
FOY HAD SHARED SUCH CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION. The 
"notice of violation" was MAILED to Defendant FOY in 
"southeastern Utah", exactly consistent with what 
Renter K Cooper was saying. A mere 11 days later after 
the assumed mailing of the "Notice of Violation" to 
FOY, the October 25th "request for hearing" is mailed 
and is thereafter received by the CITY. It is "filed" 
in the very case file [#97-5215] applicable to the 
"Teresa Foy case".4 The foregoing, read "in good faith" 
(which the CITY now doesn't want to practice) and 
reasonably would lead to one clear conclusion: that the 
"agent" (e.g. "Renter K Cooper") has been ostensibly 
clothed with what the law characterizes is "apparent 
4The Defendant's attempts [December 1999 and March 2002] 
to ascertain the FACTUAL TRUTH of the CITY'S scheduling of 
"hearing" in the "Teresa Foy case" have been consistently and 
effectively resisted and frustrated by the CITY and its 
counsel! 
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authority"! In recognition of the "apparent authority" 
of such person (indeed, a "responsible person"), the 
CITY simply should have scheduled which CITY 
initially did and thereafter conducted which the 
CITY DIDN'T the requested hearing. 
The CITY'S Municipal Code [Title 10] pertaining 
to the issuance and contents of the "notice of 
violation" expressly provides as follows: 
10-2-102. NOTICE OF VIOLATION. 
. . . The notice of violation shall include 
the following information: 
(1) Procedures to request a hearing, 
and consequences for failure to 
request one. 
There is NO STATED REQUIREMENT within EITHER the 
Ordinance or the form "notice" promulgated and issued 
in ostensible compliance with the Ordinance which 
requires any "agency" designation be proved 
concurrently with the submission of the "request for 
hearing". There is but a SINGLE SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENT 
concerning the "request for hearing": that it be "in 
writing". Contrary to the CITY'S counsel's frequent 
assertion, there is within the ordinance NO stated 
requirement that (1) the "request" be manually signed, 
or (2) that the "request" be in any specified form, or 
(3) that any "agency" situation requires a formal 
17 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
designation and/or additional language or notarization. 
In similar vein, the "notice of violation" letter from 
the CITY contained NO EXPRESS REQUIREMENTS as to a 
specified or expected "form" or "substance" to be 
contained in the "request for hearing". As per the 
1993-recorded quit-claim deed, the CITY and its 
officials were presumptively and officially "on notice" 
that Lancer, Incorporated owned the "south parcel", 
which contained the majority of the observed alleged 
"violations"! Thus, the CITY cannot ignore the "K 
Cooper letter", whether written as FOY's agent or not; 
Cooper, as a tenant, in-possession, etc., must be 
deemed to be a "Responsible Person" and his "request 
for hearing" is mandated to be acted upon. In any 
event, K Cooper can be deemed to be an agent of the 
Lancer, Incorporated entity! 
The October 1997 "Notice of Violation" states, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
Hearing Rights 
You have the right to request a hearing to 
determine if any violations exist on your 
property or if you have allowed violations to 
occur for which you are responsible. You must 
file a written request for hearing within 10 
days from the date the notice of violation was 
issued. If the notice was mailed, the request 
for hearing must be made within 13 days of the 
mailing date. Address the request to the 
attention of "Administrative Hearing 
Coordinator." Please include your name, 
address, telephone number, case or citation 
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number, and violation address. . . . 
Emphasis added. 
The "Renter K Cooper letter" is addressed to the 
Administrative Hearing Coordinator. The letter 
conforms, IN SUBSTANCE, to the mandatory provisions, as 
directed. The permissive (i.e. "please include") 
requirements WERE HONORED WITH EXACTNESS, except for 
the providing of a telephone number. [There is no 
requirement under the law for a person to have a 
telephone number. Furthermore, that the CITY has 
DEMANDED that everything be "in writing" visciates any 
"requirement" concerning the need for a telephone 
number, which might be useful only in the context of 
scheduling a hearing!] The CITY knows exactly that the 
"Renter K Cooper" letter refers to this case, because 
the letter has been filed in the "Teresa Foy case" 
official file! 
The CITY itself characterizes the situation (i.e 
the propertyowner's entitlement to a hearing) as being 
a "right". [See "Notice of Violation" letter. CITY 
ordinances also utilize the characterization "right".] 
Indeed, Section 10-2-501 of the CITY'S Municipal Code 
provides: 
10-2-501. DECLARATION OF PURPOSE. 
The City Council finds that there is a need to 
establish uniform procedures for 
19 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
administrative code enforcement hearings 
conducted pursuant to the City Code. It is the 
purpose and intent of the City Council to 
afford due process of law to any person who is 
directly affected by an administrative action. 
Due process of law includes adequate notice, 
an opportunity to participate in the 
administrative hearing, and an adequate 
explanation of the reasons justifying the 
administrative action. These procedures are 
also intended to establish a forum to 
efficiently, expeditiously, and fairly resolve 
issues raised in any administrative 
enforcement action. 
Emphasis added. 
Section 10-2-103 of the West Valley City ordinances 
provides: 
10-2-103. REQUESTING HEARING. 
The responsible person has the right to 
request an administrative hearing. The request 
must be in writing and must be filed within 
ten days from the date of service of the 
notice of violation. Failure to request a 
hearing as provided shall constitute a waiver 
of the right to a hearing. 
Emphasis added. 
It is the most ironic paradox that the corporate 
entity [LANCER, INCORPORATED] cannot "act through its 
agent" ["Renter K Cooper" as a "responsible party", if 
the City chooses]. The City should not be allowed to 
"pick and choose" which "agent" it is bound to 
acknowledge. Indeed, following receipt of the "request 
for hearing", the City through its agents engaged in 
considerable dialogue with Defendant FOY concerning who 
actually was her "agent" for purposes of the property 
20 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and the scheduled hearing, and inspections of the 
property. See EXHIBIT 2, attached to this APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF. RECORD at 000052. 
The CITY should not be allowed to say that a 
hearing was not requested (by FOY). BECAUSE A HEARING 
WAS REQUESTED! Concerning this type of issue (i.e. 
municipality's compliance with its own ordinances) , the 
Utah Supreme Court has written: 
. . . Stated simply, the City cannot "change 
the rules halfway through the game." Brendle 
vs City of Draper, 937 P.2d 1044, 1048 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997)• The City was not entitled to 
disregard its mandatory ordinances. Because 
the City did not properly comply with the 
ordinances governing P.U.D. approval, we 
conclude that under Utah Code Ann. §10-9-
1001(3) (b), the City's decision approving the 
P.U.D. was illegal. 
Springville Citizens vs City of Springville, 979 P.2d 
332 at 338, 199 UT 25, 1J3 0 (Utah Supreme Court 1999). 
Emphasis added. In this context, the "mandatory" term 
"shall" describing the duty of the CITY'S director to 
"schedule" (and, implicitly, to hold) a hearing 
concerning the violations cannot be overlooked. The 
CITY'S failure to conduct the hearing is a fatal defect 
which absolutely precludes the entry of judgment in the 
CITY'S favor. 
The ironic paradox of the CITY'S position (i.e. no 
hearing was granted, because no hearing was requested) 
is illuminated by the remarks made by the CITY'S 
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attorney during the 13 January 2003 oral argument 
before the District Court: 
Mr LAWRENCE: . . . Ms. Foy did not request a 
hearing within the meaning of the City Statute 
which requires that the request for hearing be 
in writing and be signed by the responsible 
person.5 
Ms. Foy now argues that a letter which 
the City received which we acknowledge 
receiving and we acknowledge receiving it 
within the time period but it was from a 
person named Kay Cooper, supposed a tenant on 
the property. We don't know who Kay Cooper is. 
Ms. Foy has made no effort to produce Mr. 
Cooper. We don't know what his responsibility 
or relationship to her was. The City is not 
obligated to take action on the basis of some 
stranger. In fact, we feel it is a way of 
protecting Ms. Foy's rights in the property 
that some stranger who we don't know could 
come up and make any type of decision 
regarding her property. In the City's opinion 
the statute is very clear. A request is in 
writing signed by the responsible person. If 
she wanted a hearing she should have requested 
it. If she wanted to bring in this Cooper 
person or her agent, Mr. Decker, she should 
have done so through the administrative 
process. She chose not to. She chose not to. 
She assumed the risk that the fines would be 
imposed. 
Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing, 13 January 
2003, page 2, line 8 through page 3, line 3. Emphasis 
added. RECORD at 000732-000733. 
The CITY'S position is ludicrous and inconsistent. 
Under the now-stated justification of "protecting Ms. 
50n this latter point---that the "request" be signed 
the CITY'S attorney is in error and is misleading: there is NO 
REQUIREMENT in either the ordinance or in the "Notice of 
Violation" materials sent to the propertyowner which 
requires the "request" to be signed! 
22 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Foy's rights" (Mr Lawrence's terminology, quoted 
above), the CITY goes forward and DENIES her the very 
"hearing" her agent requested! The CITY then imposes, 
through its Hearing Officer, in an ex parte (or 
default) fashion, the administrative fines in FULL 
AMOUNT against her! Some "protection"! [The CITY, were 
it as legitimately concerned about "protecting" Ms 
FOY's rights as it claims, could have merely 
straightened out the "agency" issue, with Ms FOY.] 
Later within the 13 January 2 0 03 "summary judgment 
oral argument hearing" Mr Lawrence (counsel for the 
CITY) stated: 
MR. LAWRENCE: She acknowledged receiving that 
notice. I believe it was October 28th or 29th 
which was within the ten day period for her to 
respond. Within that ten day period the City 
received a letter signed by someone named K. 
Cooper, the initial "K". The City did not 
accept that as a valid request for a hearing 
because we don't know who Mr. Cooper is. We 
had no idea of what his connection to the 
property was. He claimed he was a tenant. We 
don't, the letter claims he was a tenant. 
Because we felt that the property owner, the 
responsible person has the responsibility of 
requesting a hearing, we held that was not a 
valid request for a hearing. 
Transcript of 13 January 2003 Summary Judgment Hearing, 
page 23, lines 8 through 19. Emphasis added. RECORD at 
000753 . 
The CITY mischaracterized the actual "evidence" 
before the District Court. The Plaintiff's Summary 
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Judgment Memorandum intentionally misstated and 
misrepresents the administrative history of this case. 
The Plaintiff's Memorandum stated [numbered items 
#5 of the so-called "Undisputed Facts" on page 2 
thereof] that 
" . . .Foy had the right to a hearing, and had 
until October 30, 1997 to request a hearing." 
Emphasis added. RECORD at 00560. The following 
"undisputed fact" [#6] states in its entirety: 
6. Although Foy acknowledged receiving the 
Notice, the City received no written request 
for a hearing from her. 
RECORD at 00560-00561. Emphasis added. As "authority" 
for the foregoing assertion, reference is made to the 
Deposition of Teresa Foy. Nevertheless, the sophistry 
and syntax of the wording of "fact #6" is noteworthy. 
When the Defendant's deposition is examined, the 
following testimony is "in the record": 
Q (by Mr Lawrence) : Did you receive a 
Notice of Violation that there were alleged 
violations on the property? 
A (by Ms Foy): Yes, I did. 
Q You received the letter, that was at your 
address in Blanding? 
A In Blanding, Utah, yes. 
Q Did you contact the West Valley City at 
the office? 
A No, I did not. 
Q Did you contact them in writing? 
A No, I did not contact West Valley. I 
contacted my agent, Jim Decker who lived at 
the property who was my husband. 
Q So you contacted him? 
A Yes. 
Q And what did you say? 
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A I said this needs to be taken care of* 
Q And to your knowledge did he take care of it? 
A I don't know, I was down in Blanding. I 
have no record or I did not see anything or 
did not know. I just told him to take care of 
it. 
Q Okay, I have no other questions. 
DEPOSITION OF TERESA FOY, page 6. RECORD at 00579. 
Emphasis added. Thus, Defendant FOY "authorized" her 
"agent(s)" to "take care of" the problem: those agents 
had "authority" to "request a hearing", and did so! 
That Ms FOY did not personally request a hearing 
does not imply that a hearing was not requested 
albeit by her agent! What has been conveniently deleted 
from the CITY'S self-serving characterization of the 
"undisputed facts" [i.e. particularly #6] is that the 
Plaintiff's agent Jim Decker caused a written 
request for hearing to be sent to West Valley City, by 
"Tenant K Cooper". 
Although the City originally scheduled the matter 
for a "hearing" (in December 1997), that hearing was 
unilaterally cancelled and the "Jim Decker case" 
involving the corporate property was heard in its 
stead. See also SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES DECKER, 
Paragraph 3. RECORD at 000513. The City claimed it had 
no indication of authority in favor of "K Cooper" to 
request a hearing, and so for a month (e.g. November 
1997, until November 24th or so) the City dances around 
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and requests that Mrs Foy provide some kind of written 
authorization, to the effect that Jim Decker is her 
"agent". Ultimately, FOY provided that authorization: 
her November 24th letter, as included in Plaintiff's 
MEMORANDUM. RECORD at 000584. 
That the City received a "request for hearing" is 
acknowledged and confirmed by Candace Gleed, 
Administrative Hearing Director, in her deposition, in 
which she stated: 
Q [by Mr Homer]: Well, you received a written 
request for hearing and you obviously thought 
that it referred to this parcel because it 
ended up in this file? 
A [by Ms Gleed]: Correct. 
Q: So what did you do at that point? 
A: We did nothing with it. . . 
Candace Gleed Deposition, page 17, lines 19 through 24. 
Emphasis added. [RECORD at .] 
The CITY seemingly takes the inconsistent position 
that the "Cooper letter" does not constitute the 
requisite "request". [As noted, this position 
contradicts the CITY'S earlier actions during the 
entire month of November 1997 when the CITY actively 
was proceeding towards a scheduled hearing on the "Foy 
parcel".6] The "Cooper letter" was written at the 
6The Defendant FOY attempted to engage in pre-trial 
discovery as to the scheduling of the hearing on the "Foy 
parcel", the creation of separate files for the "Foy" and 
"Lancer" parcels (but only after 1 December 1997), and the 
particular violations which were observed on each of the two 
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direction of Ms Foy's agent, Mr Jim Decker. [See 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES W DECKER. RECORD at 000091-000095.] 
It is sufficient to invoke the right to a "hearing" . In 
this context, it is further significant that the CITY 
seemingly takes the position that Ms Foy is a 
"responsible person" (for purposes of designating a 
natural person to whom the Notice of Violation was 
sent). Section 10-1-110 (u) of the pertinent WVC 
Ordinance gives certain "status" examples to illustrate 
who may be considered to be a "responsible person", as 
follows: 
The term "Responsible Person" includes, but is 
not limited to, a property owner, tenant, 
person with a legal interest in real property 
or person in possession of real property. 
Emphasis added. Mr Cooper was a "tenant" and a "person 
in possession" of the real property. Thus, as a 
"responsible person" under the City's own "definition" 
for the "Notice of Violation" purposes, his written 
letter should be sufficient to invoke the right to a 
"hearing", as the City initially commenced to undertake 
but in the end did not follow-through. 
The Plaintiff has submitted the November 24th 
letter of TERESA FOY as "Exhibit C" to its Memorandum. 
parcels. This otherwise material and legitimate pre-trial 
discovery was strongly resisted by the CITY, which obtained a 
"protective order" keeping such critical information 
undisclosed. 
27 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Arguably, the letter "speaks for itself". The text of 
the letter is interesting: namely, there seems to have 
been considerable discussion between Ms FOY (in 
Blanding, Utah) and the CITY'S administrative 
personnel, including but not limited to the CITY'S 
apparent request that Ms FOY provide written 
documentation as to Mr Jim Decker's "agent" status in 
representing the interests of Ms FOY. However, the text 
itself is not what is probative of the issues. That the 
letter was simply written and submitted as contrasted 
with what it said and is herewith submitted is 
significant: if only as unqualified PROOF that the CITY 
was then proceeding towards a "hearing" as requested! 
If a hearing was not going to be conducted, then there 
would have been no necessity for the CITY staff dialog 
with Ms FOY and request that she submit something in 
writing as to Decker's status (as an "agent"). These 
factual inferences should have been approached in a 
light favorable to the non-moving party [FOY] , such 
that the District Court should not have granted summary 
judgment.7 
7The District Court's granting of summary judgment in favor of 
the CITY on the basis that FOY had failed to "exhaust her 
administrative remedies" (by failing to request a hearing) 
implicitly disregards the numerous "legal defenses" FOY pleaded. 
That FOY, in the District Court action, is entitled to raise and 
defend on those "legal defenses" is provided by Section 63-46-
19(3), Utah Code, which provides in relevant part: 
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B 
THE CITY'S FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY COMPLY WITH 
PERTINENT PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY REQUESTS 
ESTOPS THE CITY FROM ASSERTING 
THE FACTS ARE NOT IN GENUINE DISPUTE 
In March 2002 the Plaintiff responded to 
Defendant's SECOND REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS BY PLAINTIFF 
WEST VALLEY CITY. The Defendant's "requests for 
admissions" focused upon numerous "factual core issues" 
pertinent to the case. The Plaintiff's three-page 
"response" to the Defendant's "requests for admissions" 
is essentially verbatim and consistent8 in its answer 
(response), as follows: 
The City neither admits nor denies this 
request. The records of the West Valley City 
Enforcement Division, and the records 
previously submitted in this matter, are the 
best evidence pertaining to this request, and 
speak for themselves. 
Emphasis added. RECORD at 000611-000614. A photocopy of 
(3) In any proceeding for civil enforcement of an 
agency's order, in addition to any other defenses allowed 
by law, a defendant may defend on the ground that: 
(a) the order sought to be enforced was issued 
by an agency without jurisdiction to issue the 
order; 
Emphasis added. The CITY'S failure to abide by its own MANDATORY 
ordinances deprives the agency of "jurisdiction" to enter the 
"order" (i.e. administrative fines) sought to be judicially 
enforced. 
8The only difference in any of the responses is that the 
response to Request #1 refers to "the records of the Salt Lake 
County Recorder", whereas the other responses refer to "the 
records of West Valley City code enforcement division". 
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the City's 4-page response is attached hereto as 
EXHIBIT #4. [The Defendant thereafter filed a motion to 
determine the sufficiency of the CITY'S responses to 
the Requests for Admissions. RECORD at 000672-00697. 
The Defendant's motion was denied by the District 
Court.] 
The Defendant's "requests for admissions" are 
legitimate pre-trial discovery, to which a meaningful 
response is REQUIRED. The CITY must admit or deny those 
requests; the City should not be allowed to "duck the 
issue" through the consistent use of an unresponsive 
answer to the "requests for admissions"! 
Having given such evasive and unresponsive 
"answers" to the Requests for Admissions whose 
purpose was to precisely focus upon specific factual 
issues the Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY cannot now say 
that the facts are not in genuine dispute. The CITY, by 
its own EVASIVE responses (non-answers) to the Requests 
for Admissions cannot claim the facts are not in 
genuine dispute; thus, the City cannot claim that 
Summary Judgment is appropriate! 
To the previously-submitted "requests for 
admissions" and other pre-trial "discovery requests", 
first submitted to the City in December 1999, the CITY 
did not answer but instead filed a motion for a 
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"protective order" and claimed to answer the discovery 
would be unduly burdensome. The City eventually agreed 
to conduct an "administrative hearing" (the so-called 
"remand hearing"), during which the Defendant could 
cross-examine the City-provided witnesses and thus 
develop a sworn testimony "record" as to the City's 
evidence and/or position on these issues. However, when 
the City finally conducted the "administrative hearing" 
before Remand Hearing Officer Zane Gill9 the City's 
attorney (Mr Elliot Lawrence) produced NO WITNESSES, 
produced NO SWORN TESTIMONY, and only produced and 
offered for admission into evidence (but without 
sufficient custodial or foundational explanation) 
certain "hearsay" documents (i.e. "corporation" records 
from the State of Utah) having nothing to do with the 
merits of the claimed violations! 
II 
CITY'S FAILURE TO FOLLOW ITS OWN ORDINANCES 
[CONCERNING THE GRANTING OF THE REQUESTED "HEARING"] 
PRECLUDES SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE CITY 
As noted above, Defendant FOY, through her "agents" 
(who, as "tenants" in possession of the premises, were 
"responsible persons" for the alleged "violations") 
requested the administrative "hearing". The CITY never 
9ALJ Keith Stoney who conducted the first hearing was 
disqualified by order of the District Court, which ordered a 
new "hearing" before an impartial administrative law judge. 
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granted the hearing.10 
That a hearing is to be held is MANDATED by the 
City's own ordinances! Section 10-2-503 of the CITY'S 
"Municipal Code", pertaining to "REQUEST FOR 
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ENFORCEMENT HEARING" states: 
(2) The request for hearing shall be made in 
writing and filed with the Director. 
(3) As soon as practicable after receiving 
the written notice of the request for hearing, 
the Director shall appoint an administrative 
code enforcement hearing officer and schedule 
a date, time, and place for the hearing. 
Emphasis added. 
The MANDATORY NATURE of the requirement is stated 
clearly. [Note the "passive voice" wording of 
Subsection (2) of the ordinance. But Subsection (3) is 
absolutely clear that after a "written request for 
hearing" is received, the Director "SHALL" schedule a 
hearing!] 
Section 10-2-503 of the CITY'S "Municipal Code", 
pertaining to "REQUEST FOR ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 
10Mr Decker asserted that the CITY "switched" the "Foy 
hearing" (which had been originally scheduled for early 
December) with the "Jim Decker hearing" on the case which had 
been "opened" by the CITY just a few days before. See 
AFFIDAVIT OF JIM DECKER, %7. RECORD at 000091-000096.The 
administrative files of the CITY, produced pursuant to a 
G.R.A.M.A. request but not produced pursuant to pre-trial 
discovery, as being the subject of a "protective order" 
entered by the District Court, are unclear and ambiguous on 
these issues. 
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ENFORCEMENT HEARING" States: 
(2) The request for hearing shall be made in 
writing and filed with the Director. 
(3) As soon as practicable after receiving 
the written notice of the request for hearing, 
the Director shall appoint an administrative 
code enforcement hearing office and schedule 
a date, time, and place for the hearing. 
Emphasis added. 
The MANDATORY NATURE of the CITY'S usage of the 
verb "shall" [in WVCMC § 10-2-503(3): as in "the 
Director shall schedule the hearing"] is made clear by 
two provisions of the West Valley City ordinances, 
thus: 
1-1-102 RULES OF CONSTRUCTION. 
In the construction of this Code, and of all 
ordinances of the City, the following rules 
shall be observed, unless such construction 
would be inconsistent with the manifest intent 
of the City Council, or the content clearly 
requires or indicates otherwise. 
(3) "May" means the requirement, 
condition, or action referred to in 
the sentence is permissive. 
(6) "Shall" means the requirement, 
condition, or action referred to in 
the sentence is mandatory. 
Emphasis added. 
In WVCMC §10-1-109, adopted in 1997 as part of the 
Code Enforcement Ordinance, the municipal ordinance 
provides: 
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10-1-109 GENERAL RULES OF INTERPRETATION OF 
ORDINANCE 
For purposes of this Title: 
(2) Shall is mandatory, may is permissive. 
Emphasis added. 
In Springville Citizens for a Better Community vs 
City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 332 (Utah 
Supreme Court 1999), the Supreme Court invalidated 
municipal action due to the municipality's failure to 
comply with its own legislatively-enacted standard made 
mandatory through the use of the term "shall". The 
Court wrote: 
. The irony of the City's position on 
appeal is readily apparent: the City contends 
that it need only "substantially comply" with 
ordinances it has legislatively deemed to be 
mandatory. Stated simply, the City cannot 
"change the rules halfway through the game." 
Brendle v. City of Draper, 937 P.2d 1044, 1048 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) . The City was not 
entitled to disregard its mandatory 
ordinances. 
1999 UT 25 at 1J3Q, 979 P.2d at 338. Emphasis added. 
In Herr vs Salt Lake County, 525 P.2d 728 (Utah 
Supreme Court 1974), the Utah Supreme Court wrote: 
The meaning of the word shall is ordinarily 
that of command. 
Emphasis added. 525 P.2d at 729. 
In West Valley City vs Roberts, 1999 Utah Ct App 
358, 993 P.2d 252 (Utah Court of Appeals 1999), the 
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Utah Court of Appeals held that the mandatory 
requirement that administrative hearings be tape 
recorded warranted a reversal of the District Court's 
dismissal of a "petition for review" on the basis that 
no electromagnetic recording was actually made. The 
case was remanded for a new hearing.11 
Ill 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN OSTENSIBLY IMPOSING 
PERSONAL LIABILITY UPON DEFENDANT FOY 
FOR THE CLAIMED VIOLATIONS ON THE SOUTHERN PARCEL 
OWNED BY THE CORPORATE ENTITY BY REASON OF 
HER "DIRECTOR" STATUS WITH THAT CORPORATION 
As noted, there were in actuality TWO PARCELS upon 
which the alleged violations: the 0.15-acre parcel [the 
"north parcel" or the "FOY parcel"] actually owned by 
FOY and the 0.30-acre parcel [the "south parcel" or the 
"Lancer parcel"] owned by the separate legal entity, 
Lancer Incorporated, a Utah corporation. 
At the first "remand hearing" (before Hearing 
l:LThe case at bar is procedurally distinguishable from 
Roberts, which involved a "petition for review" of the 
administrative hearing. In the case at bar, the City 
ostensibly seeking judicial action to enforce (i.e. collect 
upon its otherwise uncollectible "administrative fines") the 
administrative order has filed the action. The instant 
action is NOT one involving "judicial review" of an agency 
action. Thus, the Court has no "jurisdiction" to remand the 
case back to the administrative hearing officer. 
The CITY'S failure to abide by the conditions 
prerequisite necessary for its claims (that is, to grant the 
requested hearing) , simply precludes the CITY as a matter of 
law of obtaining any judgment in its favor! 
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Officer Stoney, who was later disqualified by District 
Court action), CITY witnesses testified that only two 
of the six alleged violations were observed upon the 
FOY parcel. Furthermore, the alleged violations upon 
the FOY parcel were cleaned up as of the November 26th 
inspection. Thus, there were, at most, only about 2 6 
days' (not forty-seven days') worth of violation, and 
then only two violations (not six) . CITY witnesses 
claimed that the other FOUR violations were located 
SOLELY upon the Lancer, Incorporated parcel. [CITY 
witnesses also stated that one of the violations (of 
the two) on the FOY parcel was also located on the 
Lancer parcel.] 
The electromagnetic tape recording of the "remand 
hearing" (in lieu of the CITY'S response to the pre-
trial discovery) was LOST while in the custody of the 
CITY and its personnel (Hearing Officer Stoney and/or 
others) . Also LOST were the large blueprint-sized 
drawing (map) showing the location of the allegedly-
observed "violations", as well as the photograph of 
that same map. 
At the second "remand" hearing (following Hearing 
Officer Stoney's disqualification by the District 
Court), the CITY'S attorney (Mr Lawrence), contrary to 
his representations to the District Court (that the 
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Defendant would have opportunity to develop a factual 
record), had available for presentation of sworn, live 
testimony NO WITNESSES. Instead, Mr Lawrence merely 
presented a few documents actually photocopies of 
"corporation" records from the Utah Department of 
Commerce ostensibly evidencing the "director" (not 
officer) status of Defendant FOY with the Lancer, 
Incorporated entity. These documents, with counsel's 
unsworn explanation as to foundation and significance, 
were received by the "remand" hearing officer (Zane 
Gill) over the objection of Defendant FOY, ostensibly 
for the purpose of establishing that the "clutter" on 
the premises what that of Defendant FOY. [In actuality, 
the District Court's "remand order" was intended to 
ascertain the "location" not the "ownership" of the 
observed violations]. 
The CITY argued which arguments were ultimately 
accepted by the District Court that as a "corporate 
officer" of Lancer, she was PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE for 
the "violations" committed upon the Lancer parcel, 
thus : 
MR. LAWRENCE: Your Honor, the City has never 
said that she's liable for the actual 
corporation. We said she is a responsible 
person for the actual corporation. A manager 
of a business can only serve as a 
representative of that business. She's a 
director of Lancer Incorporated and she's one 
of two shareholders. She's responsible. If she 
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wants to recover from Lancer Incorporated then 
she can, if you renew this objection to using 
evidence of the hearings that officially 
didn't exist. 
Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing, 13 January 
2003, page 14, lines 14 through 21. Emphasis added. 
RECORD at 000728-000756. 
That the City would argue and that the District 
Court would ostensibly rule that the individual 
corporate "director" (e.g. FOY) is "personally" 
responsible for the debts of the corporation (i.e. 
through her payment of the assessed "administrative 
fines", for which she can seek "reimbursement" from the 
corporation, as Mr Lawrence has stated) goes against 
hundreds and hundreds of years of black-letter 
"corporate law". 
A corporation is a SEPARATE, free-standing entity. 
Except in the most narrow of situations not present 
in the case at bar a corporate director or 
shareholder is NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE for the debts of 
the corporate entity. 
Because the CITY assumed incorrectly that 
Defendant FOY owned the entire "parcel" (i.e. 
approximately 205 feet in the north-south dimension), 
the "administrative order" assessed fines against her 
personally for claimed "violations" occurring on the 
"southern parcel" (owned by LANCER, INCORPORATED). The 
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City's oversight became apparent only after this 
litigation was filed and "answered", although Defendant 
FOY's on-site agent (James Decker) had previously 
explained the situation to CITY personnel.12 
12That the CITY was unaware of the corporate ownership of 
the "southern parcel" was "found" by ALJ Keith Stoney during 
the first "remand hearing". ALJ Stoney noted: 
. . . However, because Lancer Inc., was the owner of 
the back parcel, but was unknown to the City; 
because the 2nd parcel has the same address as the 
first; . . . 
Administrative Code Enforcement Order, p. 17, dated 8 August 
2000. RECORD at 000489. 
Although ALJ Stoney was subsequently disqualified as 
being arguably less than impartial within the "remand" 
context, his observation on this narrow point is correct. 
Furthermore, his finding as to the location of the 
various claimed "violations" is absolutely significant. ALJ 
Stoney wrote: 
(3) The "Notice of Violation" delineated six 
violations, four of which existed only on Lancer 
Inc. property and a fifth, weeds over six inches, 
existed predominantly on Lancer Inc. property. 
Emphasis added. RECORD at 000479. Thus, any actual or imputed 
bias or lack of objectivity on the part of ALJ Stoney aside, 
his stated "finding" (quoted) as to the locations 
AFFIRMATIVELY SHOWS as was the testimony of the CITY'S OWN 
WITNESSES who testified under oath as to the locations of the 
claimed "violations" that FOUR OUT OF SIX claimed violations 
occurred on "the Lancer parcel" and NOT the Teresa Foy parcel! 
Thus, by simple arithmetic, the most the CITY would be 
entitled to receive in a judicial judgment against FOY would 
be two-sixths (one-third) of the $6900 claimed: approximately 
$2300. 
Unfortunately, the CITY has lost, misplaced and/or erased 
the electromagnetic tape recording of the Stoney "remand" 
hearing. The CITY has also lost the diagram (map) upon which 
the City's own witnesses testified as to the locations with 
respect to the two distinct parcels of the claimed 
violations. How convenient! Such certainly deprives the 
Defendant of any meaningful "judicial review" of the "remand 
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The CITY asserted that because Defendant FOY was 
a "director" of LANCER, INCORPORATED, she is still 
personally liable for the "fines" assessed for the 
claimed "violations" committed upon the "Lancer 
parcel". Over the vigorous and timely objection of the 
Defendant FOY, the District Court implicitly ruled that 
she was personally liable for those corporate debts. 
It is essentially "black-letter law", established 
for centuries that corporate directors and investors 
ARE NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE for the debts of the 
corporate entity. On this particular issue the 
encyclopedic work American Jurisprudence (Second) under 
the entry "Corporations" and more specifically focusing 
upon "director liability" states: 
§1829. Generally 
In most instances, the directors or officers 
of a corporation are not liable to its 
creditors or third persons for corporate acts 
or debts. The directors or officers of a 
corporation are not liable for corporate acts 
and debts simply by reason of their official 
relation to the corporation; they are merely 
the agents of the corporation and on principle 
should no more be held liable therefor than 
any other agent should be held liable for the 
acts and debts of his principal. They are not ; 
guarantors of corporate debts, . . . 
hearing" process. [The second "remand hearing" was no better: 
the CITY produced NO SWORN WITNESSES. RECORD at 000604. See 
also SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES W DECKER, %5. RECORD at 
000512-000514.] 
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18B Am Jur 2d, "Corporations", p. 680. Emphasis added. 
Footnotes to cases omitted. 
This principle (of non-liability of the corporate 
director) is followed in Utah. In Stratton vs West 
States Construction, 21 Utah 2d 60, 440 P. 2d 117 (Utah 
Supreme Court 1968) , cited in the Am Jur 2d article 
quoted herein, the plaintiff had contracted with the 
corporate defendant for home remodeling services. The 
plaintiff brought suit against the corporation AND its 
president and major stockholder (Mr Lords), who 
appealed an adverse trial court judgment against him. 
In REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT'S ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
PERSONALLY AGAINST THE CORPORATE OFFICER, the Utah 
Supreme Court wrote: 
. . . The mere fact that Lords was president 
and major stockholder of defendant corporation 
through which he might derive an incidental 
benefit from the corporate breach, does not 
indicate he was acting for his personal 
benefit. A corporation can only act through 
its agents, and there is no evidence 
indicating that Lords in his participation in 
the transaction acted beyond the scope of his 
powers or against the interests of the 
corporation. 
440 P.2d at 118. Emphasis added. 
Indeed, the "state law" on this subject 
notwithstanding any "municipal law" in conflict 
therewith, which conflict would render the municipal 
provisions INVALID is clearly consistent with those 
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centuries-old principles. Section 16-10a-302
 # Utah 
Code, effective since 1992, provides for the following 
"corporate powers": 
(1) to sue and be sued, complain and defend 
in its corporate name; 
(4) to purchase, receive, lease, or otherwise 
acquire and own, hold, improve, use, and 
otherwise deal with, real or personal 
property, or any legal or equitable interest 
in property, wherever located; 
Emphasis added. 
The provisions of Section 10-1-202 of the CITY'S 
own Municipal Code are significant: 
10-1-202 CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF RECORDED 
DOCUMENTS. 
Whenever a document is recorded with the 
County Recorder as authorized or required by 
this Title or applicable state codes, 
recordation shall provide constructive notice 
of the information contained in the recorded 
document. 
Emphasis added. In 1993 the Defendant FOY conveyed by 
Quit-Claim Deed properly delivered to the grantee 
(Lancer, Incorporated) and thereafter RECORDED in the 
Office of the Salt Lake County Recorder to the 
corporation LANCER, INCORPORATED her interest in the 
"Lancer, Incorporated parcel". See Quit-Claim Deed, 
dated 1 July 1993 and recorded 6 July 1993; recordation 
# 5346983. [The recordation of that Deed actually 
CREATED the so-called "Lancer, Incorporated parcel".] 
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Thereafter, the entire world is "on notice" that the 
corporation not Defendant FOY is THE OWNER of the 
parcel. The CITY'S own ordinance [Section 10-1-202] 
states that such a recordation "shall provide 
constructive notice of the information contained in the 
recorded document". Under Section 57-1-13, Utah Code, 
a quit-claim deed properly executed and delivered 
. . . shall have the effect of a conveyance of 
all right, title, interest and estate of the 
grantor in and to the premises therein 
described and all rights, privileges and 
appurtenances thereunto belonging, at the date 
of such conveyance• 
Emphasis added. 
That the CITY, having made a major mistake in 
overlooking the CORPORATE OWNERSHIP of the "south 
parcel" upon which the majority of the claimed 
violations were located, cannot now successfully 
practice "damage control" by claiming that Defendant 
FOY, as a "director" of the corporate entity, is 
personally liable to pay the "fines" associated with 
such claimed violations. The CITY'S complaint 
[Paragraph 3] describes the "property" (its 
terminology) as the 104-foot north-south dimension 
parcel: the 0.15-acre Teresa Foy parcel. The Complaint 
thereafter [Paragraph 5 thereof] makes sweeping 
allegations denied in Defendant's "answer" as to 
the existence of the SIX claimed "ordinance violations" 
43 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
formerly present upon "the property". The Defendant's 
"answer" placed those allegations in dispute, by the 
SEVENTH DEFENSE (observed violations on property owned 
by others) and the EIGHTH DEFENSE (failure to join 
indispensable party: the owner of the parcel on which 
the violations were actually observed). 
Having committed a major blunder in its 
administrative process (i.e. the "notice of violation") 
and in its judicial pleading, the CITY has now when 
the Lancer parcel was pointed out to it attempted to 
"save face" by raising, albeit incorrectly, the 
"corporate" issue. 
The District Court was unquestionably informed of 
this "factual" situation (dispute), but chose to ignore 
the same in erroneously granting summary judgment 
against Defendant F0Yo 
IV 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, AS WELL 
AS THIS JUDICIAL PROCEEDING SEEKING ENFORCEMENT 
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION, IS INVALID 
INASMUCH AS IT CONTRAVENES THE EXPRESS PROVISIONS 
OF SECTIONS 10-11-1 ET SEQ, UTAH CODE 
The provisions of Section 10-11-1, Utah Code, are 
directly applicable to the City's actions in observing 
the clutter, deleterious objects, and debris upon real 
estate within its boundaries: the municipality's 
inspector "shall" (read: mandatory) notify the 
44 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
propertyowner and if the propertyowner doesn't clean it 
up, the municipality may and may thereafter bill the 
propertyowner for the expenses actually incurred! If 
the propertyowner doesn't pay, the charges for those 
clean-up expenses actually incurred may become a lien 
against the parcel and subject to collection with the 
property taxes. Certain procedural opportunities for 
review and "appeal" are available to the propertyowner. 
[The complete text to the provisions of Section 10-11-1 
et seq, Utah Code which have remained "on the books" 
and unchanged for decades are included herein as 
EXHIBIT 3 to this APPELLANT'S BRIEF.] 
These provisions and the CITY' s failure to comply 
therewith were pleaded as a "defense" to the CITY'S 
claims. 
The "bottom line" is that the Legislature has 
expressly mandated exactly what the municipality is to 
do, when faced with a "debris, deleterious objects, 
refuse" situation: this municipality is to clean it up 
and bill the propertyowner! But the City isn't 
authorized to "fine" the person and receive monies, in 
excess of those clean-up expenses! 
These detailed provisions, expressly and explicitly 
detailing every step to be followed (in mandatory 
context, through the use of the verb "shall"), are 
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binding upon the CITY. The CITY'S attempted reliance 
upon other, more generalized, generic "enabling 
legislation" pertaining to "nuisances"13 is misplaced! 
In Harding vs Alpine City, 656 P. 2d 985 (Utah 
Supreme Court 1982), the municipality had adopted a 
sewer-connection ordinance at variance with the 
statute, in that the municipality could have required 
the propertyowner to connect to a sewer system which 
was further away than 3 00 feet (which was the 
limitation under the statute). [The statute impliedly 
allowed a propertyowner who was not within 3 00 feet of 
the existing sewer line to not connect.] In 
invalidating the ordinance, the Supreme Court held that 
the conflicting ordinance was "clearly beyond the 
City's powers". The Harding Court quoted from the State 
vs Hutchinson decision, as follows: 
There are ample safeguards against any abuse 
of power at the local level. Local 
governments, as subdivisions of the State, 
exercise those powers granted to them by the 
State Legislature, and the exercise of a 
delegated power is subject to the limitations 
13No showing was ever made and the actual text of the 
ordinance provisions under which the Defendant was "charged" 
and administratively "fined" were presented to the Court, to 
the effect that the CITY itself by express ordinance 
designated the debris, unsightly materials, etc., situation as 
being a "nuisance". Thus, any "enabling legislation", if any, 
cited by the CITY as being applicable to the "civil fines" for 
such "nuisances" is INAPPLICABLE and INAPPROPRIATE, 
particularly in the face of the express provisions of Section 
10-11-1 et seq, Utah Code. 
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imposed by state statute and state and federal 
constitutions. 624 P.2d at 1121. 
Emphasis added. Citations to cases omitted in original 
text. 
The Harding analysis and result is clearly 
applicable to the case at bar. In the instant 
situation, Section 10-11-1, Utah Code, dealing with the 
very "debris", "junk" and other refuse allegedly at 
issue, allows the citizen propertyowner certain rights: 
(1) notification, (2) 20 days in which to respond to 
the notification, (3) which notification is mailed, 
certified mail, and (but not only) (4) the right to be 
billed ONLY FOR THE ACTUAL COSTS THE MUNICIPALITY 
ACTUALLY INCURS IN THE CLEAN-UP! To allow WEST VALLEY 
CITY to disregard the provisions of Section 10-11-1, 
Utah Code, absolutely applicable to the case at bar, 
results in the very situation which rendered the 
municipal ordinance in Harding invalid: namely, that 
certain portions of the statutory text would have to be 
read (and/or not-applied) , as a nullity. This the 
Supreme Court was unwilling to do. In the case at bar, 
we are not dealing with merely a few words of statutory 
text: we're dealing with hundreds and hundreds of words 
contained in Section 10-11-1 et seq, Utah Code. 
Plaintiff's position seeks to ignore each and every one 
of those words! 
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The West Valley Ordinance and the A.C.E. program 
established thereunder (providing for "fines" and 
"civil penalties" unrelated to the actual clean-up 
costs as contemplated by Section 10-11-1 et seq, Utah 
Code), are in conflict with State Statute and are 
invalid! 
V 
TRIAL COURTS DISMISSAL OF "WRONGFUL LIEN" 
COUNTERCLAIM WAS IMPROPER DUE TO 
GENUINE DISPUTE AS TO FACT 
Following the issuance of the "administrative 
order" assessing the $6,900 in administrative fines 
against Defendant FOY, the CITY filed for record with 
the Salt Lake County Recorder a "Notice of Violation". 
The City's stated purpose in doing so was to "notify" 
the propertyowner. [That stated reason was 
disingenuous, as the propertyowner was already aware 
through direct mailings to her of the entry of the 
administrative order.] The real purpose of the 
recordation was to "lien" the real property, so as to 
be able to collect those assessed "administrative 
fines". 
The Defendant FOY, through her agents, demanded in 
writing that the CITY remove the "liens", asserted to 
be "wrongful liens" in contravention of Section 38-9-1, 
Utah Code, in that they were not authorized by statute 
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and/or they contained material misstatements. When the 
CITY refused, the Defendant FOY filed a counterclaim. 
RECORD at 000203-000221. 
The CITY responded that the filings were not 
"liens". However, before the Defendant FOY could obtain 
meaningful responses to her pre-trial discovery 
requests (concerning how many "satisfaction" payments 
were received when parcels so "liened" were sold to 
third-parties the CITY applied for and received a 
"protective order" foreclosing any effective 
"discovery" on the issue.14 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment against Defendant FOY, when so many of the 
necessary "facts" were "in genuine dispute": 
particularly, when a "request for hearing" had been 
TIMELY FILED. The "agency" arguments advanced by the 
City are not only inconsistent with the mandatory 
provisions of its own ordinances (requiring a hearing 
to be held), but are also inconsistent with state law 
14That the District Court eventually granted a "remand" 
to an administrative hearing officer for three limited areas 
of inquiry (i.e. did the observed "clutter" belong to the 
Defendant, what efforts FOY had made towards the clean-up, and 
what costs did the CITY incur in the clean-up) did not change 
the problem. The "protective order" effectively precluded any 
meaningful development of any factual record as to what the 
CITY'S intentions and/or the CITY'S awarenesses as to the 
operational effect of the "liens". 
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(that is, that a corporation can act only through its 
"agents") . That the CITY (and the District Court) were 
fully aware that MOST of the claimed violations were 
located upon the Lancer, Incorporated parcel precludes, 
as a matter of law, the judgment against Defendant FOY, 
on the claimed basis that she was a "director" of that 
corporation and thus is a "responsible party". 
The CITY'S "code enforcement procedures" 
(ostensibly authorizing "administrative fines") when in 
fact the CITY incurred no actual expenses in the clean-
up of the parcel(s), contradicts the detailed and 
binding guidelines and requirements of Section 10-11-1 
et seq, Utah Code, properly pleaded as a "defense" and 
which should have been overcome before summary judgment 
could have been entered. 
The District Court's granting of summary judgment 
on the "wrongful lien" counterclaim was in error, in 
light of the factual disputes as to the "lien" 
documents actually filed. 
The judgment of the District Court should be and 
must be reversed. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that I caused TWO COPIES of the foregoing 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be hand-delivered and/or mailed, 
first-class postage prepaid, to Mr J Richard Catten, 
Attorney at Law, Office of the West Valley City 
Attorney, West Valley City Corporation, 3600 South 
Constitution Boulevard, West Valley City, Utah 84119, 
this 25th day of November, 2003 
,^^^^ry^wrr^u.^z^ 
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ADDENDA 
EXHIBIT 1: 25 October 1997 REQUEST FOR HEARING 
EXHIBIT 2: 24 Nov 1997 FOY letter 
EXHIBIT 3: DEFENDANT'S Requests for Admissions 
EXHIBIT 4: CITY'S Responses to discovery requests 
EXHIBIT 5. Section 10-11-1, Utah Code 
EXHIBIT 6: WEST VALLEY CITY "CODE ENFORCEMENT" ORDINANCES 
EXHIBIT 7. District Court "Memorandum Decision" 
EXHIBIT 8. District Court "Summary Judgment" Order 
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October 25, 1997 
to: Administrative Hearing Coordinator 
City of West Valley 
Ordinance Enforcement Office 
3600 South Consitutuion Blv. 
West Valley, Utah 64119 
re: case* 97-5215 
from: Renter K. Cooper 
3247 West 3650 South 
West Valley, Utah 64119 
Dear Sirs, 
Please schedual a hearing as to the above. 
Request: 1. That,the ordinance officer who issued the citation be present 
at the hearing. 
2. That the officer be available for minor questions, disscussion. 
The landlady, of this particular property, resides in distance South 
Eastern, Utah. She has made it very clear that she will have no envolement 
whatsoever. Furtherwell, she expects this matter to be handle between 
us here in West Valley City. Mail, directives should be sent to the renter 
at above address. 
The Landlady's only wish: to be informed "once and only once" of the 
clearance/resolution of these charges. 
Could a complete copy of the citation as well as excerpts of the city code 
cited as violations be mailed? We will be expecting a letter directly 
from the City Ordinance, soon. 
Thank you, 
EXHIBIT 1 000055 
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342 South 200 Est 63-11 
Blanding, Utah 84511 
November 24, 1997 
Terrie Nordell 
Ordinance Enforcement Officer 
3600 Constitution Blvd. 
West Valley City, Utah 84119-3720 
Dear Ms. Terrie Nordell or others concerned: 
Tins letter is to inform you in writing of what T talked to you about on the 
18th of November. I am working on the papers you said you needed from my 
attorney. He recommended 1 quickly finish the divorce and get the papers to you 
stating when 1 left the house and abandoned the property to James Weston Decker, 
who is at present my husband. These papers will state the house is to be Weston's 
as ownership with the divorce. So these papers will be forth coming as soon as 
possible. 
1, Teresa Decker, as deed owner of the home, give James Weston Decker 
the authority to invite inspectors on to the property at 3247 Lancer Way to inspect 
the grounds and deal with this man on this issue. 
If there is any question you have feel free to contact myself or my attorney. 
My number is 1-435-678-2788 in Blanding, Utah or ray attorney, Steven C. Russell 
at Affordable Legal Advocates. Their number is 532-5100. Nancy would be the 
one that could best answers your questions there. 
Sincerely, 
2 * Not* Mdn | / \ 
Teresa Foy Decker , , 
J 
EXHIBIT 2 J _ _ 
n A r c 1 r\c: 1 D A / ^ C 000052 
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STEPHEN G HOMER (1536) 
Attorney at Law 
9225 South Redwood Road 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
Telephone (801) 561-9665 
Attorney for Defendant TERESA FOY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
WEST VALLEY CITY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 





DEFENDANT'S SECOND SET OF 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS BY 
PLAINTIFF WEST VALLEY CITY 
Civil No. 980103950CV 
Case assigned to Judge Brian 
TO THE PLAINTIFF WEST VALLEY CITY AND ITS ATTORNEY: 
The Defendant TERESA FOY, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 
36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requests that the 
Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY admit, for the purposes of the pending 
action only, the truth of the matters identified herein. Please 
note that the matter will be deemed to be admitted unless said 
request is responded to within 30 days after service of the 
request. 
Your answer, if the request is denied, shall specifically deny 
the matter set forth or set forth in detail why tlie answering party 
cannot truthfully admit or deny the matter..A denial shall fairly 
meet the substance of the requested admission, and when good faith 
requires that a party qualify its answer or deny only a part of the 
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matter of which an admission is requested, the party shall so 
specify so much of which of it as is true and qualify the 
remainder. 
DEFINITIONS 
As utilized in this Requests for Admissions, the following words 
and phrases have the following meanings: 
The phrase "the City", "you", "your" and derivatives 
thereof refer to the Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY and/or 
its authorized officers, agents and employees acting 
within the scope of their employment with Defendant WEST 
VALLEY CITY, as appropriate. 
The phrase "Teresa Foy parcel" means and refers to that 
certain real estate located within Salt Lake County and 
having a street address of 3247 West Lancer Way (3650 
South), West Valley City, Utah. The legal description of 
the real estate is:. 
Beginning at a point which is on the South 
right-of-way line, of 3650 South Street, said 
point being 1377.7 feet South and 275 feet 
West from the Northeast Corner of Section 32, 
Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, and running thence West 64 feet; 
thence South 104 feet/ thence East 64 feet; 
thence North 10'4 feet to the point of 
beginning, [Contains 0.15 acres.] [Salt Lake 
County Sidwell # 15-32-278-054] 
The phrase "Lancer, Incorporated parcel" means and refers 
to that certain real estate located in Salt Lake County 
and more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a point which is South 104 feet 
and 1377.7 feet and West 275 feet from the 
Northeast Corner of Section 32, Township 1 
South, i Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian, and running thence South 204 feet; 
thence West 64 feet; thence North 204 feet; , 
thence East 64 feet to the point of beginnihg. 
[Contains 0.30 acres.] [Salt Lake County 
Sidwell # 15-32-278-055] 
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REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS BY PLAINTIFF WEST VALLEY CITY 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 1. Admit that on or about 14 October 
1997 the Defendant TERESA FOY was the owner of the Teresa Foy 
parcel. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 2. Admit that the administrative case 
file to which the "administrative code enforcement" [hereinafter 
sometimes "A.C.E."] action involving the "Teresa Foy parcel" was 
assigned was and is referred to by the case file number of 97-5215. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 3. Admit that the administrative 
enforcement and judicial proceedings within A.C.E. case file #97-
6058 against the Lancer, Incorporated parcel involved the same 
alleged violations (or at least some of them) which formed the 
basis of the administrative code enforcement action against the 
Teresa Foy parcel in A.C.E. case file #97-5215. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 4. Admit that following the conclusion 
of the "Jim Decker case" involving the Lancer, Incorporated parcel 
and alleged violations upon such parcel, as contained within A.C.E. 
case file #97-6058, West Valley City filed in the Third Judicial 
District Court a civil action against Jim Decker and obtained a 
money judgment against Jim Decker for , the fines and costs 
administratively assessed for the alleged violations, if any, upon 
the parcel in case file #97-6058, which District Court judgment was 
fully paid and satisfied. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 5. Admit that the violations which the 
agents of the Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY claimed to observe were 
3 
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not entirely or singularly upon the Teresa Foy parcel, but rather 
some of the claimed violations within A.C.E. case #97-5215 were 
upon the Lancer, Incorporated parcel. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 6. Admit that the request for 
administrative hearing on the "Teresa Foy parcel"of Defendant 
TERESA FOY for the hearing was received by the Plaintiff WEST 
VALLEY CITY in a timely manner, within the time periods specified 
by ordinance. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 7. Admit that in response to the 
"written request for hearing" on the Teresa Foy parcel in A.C.E. 
case #97-5215, authorized personnel of West Valley City actually 
scheduled a '"hearing" before the administrative law judge Lohra 
Miller, said hearing to'be .held on or about December 3rd of 1997. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 8. Admit that on 26 November 1997 
authorized agents and employees of the Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY, 
including but not limited 'to Code Enforcement Officer Cecelia 
Giorgi, were invited to inspect the TERESA FOY premises and did in 
fact conduct an inspection of the TERESA FOY premises. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 9. Admit that on 26 November 1997 
authorized agents and employees of the Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY, 
including but not limited to ,Code Enforcement Officer Cecelia 
Giorgi, were personally on the premises and failed to observe any 
violations of municipal ordinances upon the TERESA FOY premises. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 10. Admit that on 26 November 1997 and 
for each day thereafter, continuously until and beyond 16 December 
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1997, there were no violations on the TERESA FOY parcel. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 11. Admit that except for the 
aforementioned 26 November 1997 inspection of the TERESA FOY 
parcel, agents of the Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY did not conduct 
any inspections of the TERESA FOY parcel between the dates of 14 
October 1997 and 16'December 1997. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 12. Admit that on 26 November 1997 and on 
each date thereafter, to and including 16 December 1997, the 
Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY, through its authorized agents and 
employees, including but not limited to Code Enforcement Officer 
Cecelia Giorgi, was aware or should have been aware that there were 
no violations of municipal ordinance upon the TERESA FOY premises. 
REQUEST FOR'ADMISSION # 13. Admit that the Plaintiff WEST VALLEY 
CITY, following receipt of the request for a hearing, initially 
scheduled a hearing to be held on 8 December 1997 in A.C.E. case 
file 97-5215 (the "Teresa Fpy" case). 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 14. Admit that on 3 December 1997 Hearing 
Officer Lohra Miller, without the requested hearing being 
conducted, signed an "order of abatement" for the TERESA FOY 
parcel. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 15. Admit that on 8 December 1997 the 
hearing in case' # 97-5215 involving the claimed violations 
occurring on the TERESA FOY parcel was unilaterally cancelled by 
the agents and employees of the Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 16. Admit that on 8 December 1997 the 
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Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY held a hearing on case number 97-6058 
[the "Jim Decker case"], involving only the Lancer, Incorporated 
parcel and not the Teresa Foy parcel. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 17. Admit that the December 3rd and the 
December 16th "administrative orders" and the "administrative 
fines" assessed thereunder were not based upon first-hand evidence 
presented to the Hearing Officer, but rather upon the presumption 
that the claimed violation continues each date until municipal 
inspectors inspect the property and determine that the claimed 
violation has been terminated. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 18. Admit that the December 3rd and the 
December 16th'"administrative orders" were contrary to the evidence 
and contrary to the knowledge possessed by the agents of the 
Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY, including but not limited to Code 
Enforcement Officer Cecelia Giorgi, from the 26 November 1997 
inspection and observations upon and of the Teresa Foy parcel. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 19. Admit that on 16 December 1997 agents 
of the Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY inspected the TERESA FOY parcel 
and again found the parcel to be in compliance with city 
ordinances. * 
Respectfully submitted this, 5th day of March, 2002. 
Att^ney^for Defendant TERESA FOY 
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Elliot R. Lawrence — Bar no. 6917 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
WEST VALLEY CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
3600 Constitution Blvd. 




IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 






a Utah municipal 
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RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS 
Case no.: 980103590 
Judge: Pat B. Brian 
PLAINTIFF/WEST VALLEY CITY (the "01/0, respectfully submits this Response to 
Defendant's Requests for Admissions. In doing so, the City does not acknowledge that discovery 
in this matter has been reopened, and these responses are being submitted with the intent of resolving 
the matter presently before the Court. The responses to the requests are set forth below, with the 
numbers corresponding to the requests in the March 5, 2002 document. 
RESPONSES 
1. The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder are the best evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves. 
EXHIBIT 4 
A A A \ / > 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
s 
2. The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City 
Ordinance Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the 
best evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves. 
3. The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City 
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best 
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves. 
4. The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City 
Enforcement Division, the records of the Third District Court, and the records previously 
submitted in this matter, are the best evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for 
themselves. 
5. The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City 
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best 
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves. . 
6. The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City 
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best 
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves. 
7. The City neither admits nor denies this request. The. records of the West Valley City 
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best 
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves. 
8. The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City 
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best 
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves. 
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9. The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City 
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best 
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves. 
10. The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City 
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best 
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves. 
11. The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City 
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best 
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves. 
12. The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City 
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best 
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves. 
13. The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City 
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best 
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves. 
14. The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City 
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best 
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves. 
15. The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City 
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best 
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves.
 t 
16. The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City 
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Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best 
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves. 
17. The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City 
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best 
, evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves. 
18. The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City 
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best 
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves. 
19. The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City 
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best 
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of March, 2002. 
ELLIOT R. LAWRENCE 
Assistant City Attorney 
• i 
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INSPECTION AND CLEANING 
Abatement of weeds, garbage, refuse and un-
sightly objects. 
Notice to property owners. 
Neglect of property owners — Removal by city -
Costs of removal. 
Costs of removal to be included in tax notice. 
10-11-1. Abatement of weeds, garbage, refuse and un-
sightly objects. 
The city commissioners of cities of the first and second class 
and the city councils of the cities of the third class, and the 
board of trustees of towns, may designate, and regulate the 
abatement of, injurious and noxious weeds, garbage, refuse or 
any unsightly or deleterious objects or structures, and may 
appoint a city inspector for the purpose of carrying out the 
provisions of this chapter. 1953 
10-11-2. Notice to property owners. 
It shall be the duty of such city inspector to make careful 
examination and investigation, as may be provided by ordi-
nance, of the growth and spread of such injurious and noxious 
weeds, and of garbage, refuse or unsightly or deleterious 
objects or structures; and it shall be his duty to ascertain the 
names of the owners and descriptions of the premises where 
such weeds, garbage, refuse, objects or structures exist, and to 
serve notice in writing upon the owner or occupant of such 
land, either personally or by mailing notice, postage prepaid, 
addressed to the owner or occupant at the last known post-
office address as disclosed by the records of the county asses-
sor, requiring such owner or occupant, as the case may be, to 
eradicate, or destroy and remove, the same within such time 
as the inspector may designate, which shall not be less than 
ten days from the date of service of such notice. One notice 
shall be deemed sufficient on any lot or parcel of property for 
the entire season of weed growth during that year. The 
inspector shall make proof of service of such notice under oath, 
and file the same in the office of the county treasurer. 1953 
10-11-3. Neglect of property owners — Removal by city 
— Costs of removal. 
If any owner or occupant of lands described in such notice 
shall fail or neglect to eradicate, or destroy and remove, such 
weeds, garbage, refuse, object or structure upon the premises 
in accordance with such notice, it shall be the duty of the 
inspector, at the expense of the municipality, to employ nec-
essary assistance and cause such weeds, garbage, refuse, 
objects or structures to be removed or destroyed. He shall 
prepare an itemized statement of all expenses incurred in the 
removal and destruction of same and shall mail a copy thereof 
to the owner demanding payment within twenty days of the 
date of mailing. Said notice shall be deemed delivered when 
mailed by registered mail addressed to the property owner's 
last known address. In the event the owner fails to make 
payment of the amount set forth in said statement to the 
municipal treasurer within said twenty days, the inspector, on 
behalf of the municipality, may cause suit to be brought in an 
appropriate court of law or may refer the matter to the county 
treasurer as hereinafter provided. In the event collection of 
said costs are pursued through the courts, the municipality 
may sue for and receive judgment upon all of said costs crt 
removal and destruction together with reasonable attorneys' 
fees, interest and court costs. The municipality may execute 
on such judgment in the manner provided by law. In the event 
that the inspector elects to refer the matter to the county 
treasurer for inclusion in the tax notice of the property owner, 
he shall make, in triplicate, an itemized statement of all 
expenses incurred in the removal and destruction of the same 
and shall deliver the three copies of said statement to the 
county treasurer within ten days after the completion of the 
work of removing such weeds, garbage, refuse, objects or 
structures. 1963 
10-11-4. Costs of removal to be included in tax notice. 
Upon receipt of the itemized statement of the cost of 
destroying or removing such weeds, refuse, garbage, objects, 
or structures, the county treasurer shall forthwith mail one 
copy to the owner of the land from which the same were 
removed, together with a notice that objection in writing may 
be made within 30 days to the whole or any part of the 
statement so filed to the county legislative body. The county 
treasurer shall at the same time deliver a copy of the state-
ment to the clerk of the county legislative body. If objections to 
any statement are filed with the county legislative body, they 
shall set a date for hearing, giving notice thereof, and upon the 
hearing fix and determine the actual cost of removing the 
weeds, garbage, refuse, or unsightly or deleterious objects or 
structures, and report their findings to the county treasurer. If 
no objections to the items of the account so filed are made 
within 30 days of the date of mailing such itemized statement, 
the county treasurer shall enter the amount of such statement 
on the assessment rolls of the county in the column prepared 
for that purpose, and likewise within ten days from the date of 
the action of the county legislative body upon objections filed 
shall enter in the prepared column upon the tax rolls the 
amount found by the county legislative body as the cost of 
removing and destroying the said weeds, refuse, garbage or 
unsightly and deleterious objects or structures. If current tax 
notices have been mailed, said taxes may be carried over on 
the rolls to the following year. After the entry by the county 
treasurer of the costs of removing weeds, garbage, refuse or 
unsightly and deleterious objects or structures the amount so 
entered shall have the force and effect of a valid judgment of 
the district court, and shall be a lien upon the lands from 
which the weeds, refuse, garbage or unsightly and deleterious 
objects or structures were removed and destroyed, and shall 
be collected by the county treasurer at the time of the payment 
of general taxes. Upon payment thereof receipt shall be 
acknowledged upon the general tax receipt issued by the 
treasurer. 1993 
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SELECTED WEST VALLEY CITY CODE ORDINANCE PROVISIONS 
1-1-102 RULES OF CONSTRUCTION. 
In the construction of this Code, and of all ordinances of the City, the 
following rules shall be observed, unless such construction would be 
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the City Council, or the content 
clearly requires or indicates otherwise. 
(3) "May" means the requirement, condition, or action 
referred to in the sentence is permissive. 
(6) "Shall" means the requirement, condition, or action 
referred to in the sentence is mandatory. 
10-1-109 GENERAL RULES OF INTERPRETATION OF ORDINANCE. 
For purposes of this Title: 
(2) Shall is mandatory, may is permissive. 
10-1-110. DEFINITIONS. 
(19) "Property Owner" means the record owner of real property based on 
the County Assessor's records. 
(21) "Responsible Person" means a person the City determines is 
responsible for causing or maintaining a violation of the City Codes or 
applicable state codes. The term "Responsible Person" includes, but is 
not limited to, a property owner, tenant, person with a legal interest 
in real property, or person in possession of real property. 
10-2-103. REQUESTING HEARING. 
The responsible person has the right to request an administrative 
hearing. The request must be in writing and must be filed within ten days 
from the date of service of the notice of violation. Failure to request 
a hearing as provided shall constitute a waiver of the right to a 
hearing. 
10-2-501. DECLARATION OF PURPOSE. 
The City Council finds that there is a need to establish uniform 
procedures for administrative code enforcement hearings conducted 
pursuant to the City Code. It is the purpose and intent of the City 
Council to afford due process of law to any person who is directly 
affected by an administrative action. Due process of law includes 
adequate notice, an opportunity to participate in the administrative 
hearing, and an adequate explanation of the reasons justifying the 
administrative action. These procedures are also intended to establish 
a forum to efficiently, expeditiously, and fairly resolve issues raised 
in any administrative enforcement action. 
10-2-503 REQUEST FOR ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ENFORCEMENT HEARING 
(2) The request for hearing shall be made in writing and filed with the 
Director. 
(3) As soon as practicable after receiving the written notice of the 
request for hearing, the Director shall appoint an administrative code 
enforcement hearing office and schedule a date, time, and place for the 
hearing. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 






Case No. 980103590 _•••;.. 
Honorable PAT B.BRIAN 
1fl The above entitled matter comes before the Court for decision on the Plaintiffs motion 
for summary judgment. The Court heard oral argument addressing the motion on January 13, 
2003. The Court having reviewed all relevant memoranda submitted by the parties, applicable 
statutes and case law finds no genuine issues of material fact exist and concludes that the 
Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is 
GRANTED. . 
f2 The following facts apply tp resolve the Plaintiffs motion. This protracted collection suit 
was filed in 1998 by West Valley City (Plaintiff) against Teresa Foy (Foy) for outstanding fines 
relating to several ordinance violations of property owned and/or controlled by Foy. After a 
remand to an Administrative Law Judge and mediation, the collection suit has returned to this 
Court. In summary, on October 14, 1997, an ordinance enforcement officer on behalf of Plaintiff 
conducted an inspection of the West Valley property 3247 West 3650 South. That same day, the 
Plaintiff sent a notice of violation (notice) to Foy in Blanding, Utah, where she was living at the 
time. Foy admits receiving the notice. Foy admits that she did not respond to the notice and did 
not attempt to obtain a notice of compliance by October 30, 1997, as required and explained in 
the notice. Foy contacted her estranged husband, James W. Decker, (Decker) who was living on 
the property, and told him "this needs to be taken care of." 
1J3 The notice stated that: "You have the right to request a hearing to determine if any 
violations exist on your property or if you have allowed violations to occur for which you are 
responsible. You must file a written request for hearing within 10 days from the date the notice 
of violation was issued. If the notice was mailed, the request for hearing must be made within 13 
days of the mailing date. Address the request to the attention of'Administrative Hearing 
Coordinator.' Please include your name, address, telephone number, case or citation number, 
and violation address." The notice further emphasized in bold letters and a larger font than the 
rest of the notice that: "***Failure to file a written request for a hearing within 10 days 
waives your right to a hearing.***" 
1f4 Foy sent a letter dated November 24, 1997, to the Plaintiff to memorialize a conversation 
she had with them on November 18, 1997, that she was divorcing Decker and that he had been 
deeded her portion of the subject property. 
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1J5 Utah R. Civ. P. 56 provides that the court may grant a motion for summary judgment if 
no genuine issues of material fact exist and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
All facts are to be construed in favor of the non-moving party. 
1f6 Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 provides that: "A party may seek judicial review only after 
exhausting all administrative remedies available, except that: (a) a party seeking judicial review 
need not exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion 
is not required; (b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to 
exhaust any or all administrative remedies if: (i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
* (ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit 
derived from requiring exhaustion." 
f7 The Plaintiff argues that Foy failed to exhaust her administrative remedies by requesting 
a hearing and the Plaintiff is authorized to impose fines upon persons responsible for ordinance 
violations, therefore, the Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In opposition, Foy 
argues that a letter sent by "Renter K. Cooper Request for Hearing." was sufficient to invoke her 
request for a hearing as Cooper was an agent of Foy. 
1[8 The Court concludes that no genuine issues of material fact exist and the Plaintiff is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Foy failed to exhaust her administrative 
remedies. Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Foy, as this Court must do, the 
facts show that Foy failed to request a hearing. Foy admits in her own deposition that she 
received the notice and did nothing about it. Generally, whether there was an agency relationship 
would be a question of fact that would defeat a motion for summary judgment, however, an 
agency relationship requires permission either actual or implied that'a person is acting as an 
agent of another. Foy has failed to show that she gave Cooper such permission or implied such 
permission. In fact, for over a month, until November 18, 1997, the record shows that Foy did 
\ nothing, except call Decker, who was living on the property at the time, and telling him "this 
needs to be taken care of." Furthermore, the notice clearly informed Foy that she had "a right to 
request a hearing to determine if any violations exist on your property or if you have allowed 
violations to occur for which you are responsible" and the amount of time for her to do so. At 
this late juncture, Foy has tried to dispute that the violations existed on her property and that she 
is responsible for such violations. Foy's remedy at law was an administrative hearing. There is 
nothing in the record to show that such a hearing request was made by Foy. Moreover, Foy has 
failed to show that she should be relieved from the exhaustion of remedies rule. There is nothing 
here to show that a hearing would have been an inadequate remedy or that exhaustion of 
remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit derived from 
requiring exhaustion. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Foy improperly seeks judicial 
review of facts without exhausting all administrative remedies available, namely a hearing, 
therefore, the Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
2 
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^9 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and 
ORDERS the Plaintiff to submit an order reflecting the Court's decision. 
It is so ORDERED on this 
D i s t r ^ o u ^ ^ J J 
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JOHN W. HUBER, Bar No. 7226 
WEST VALLEY CITY PROSECUTOR 
3575 S. Market Street, 2nd Floor 
West Valley City, UT 84119 
(801)963-3331 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




) FINDINGS OF FACT, 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND ORDER 
) Case No. 980103590 
) Honorable PAT B. BRIAN 
Defendant. 
The above entitled matter comes before this Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment. After reviewing the legal memoranda and oral arguments by both parties, the Court 
finds that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Teresa Foy (Foy) failed to 
exhaust her administrative remedies; namely, Foy did not request an administrative hearing. The 
Court hereby enters the following Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. On October 14, 1997, an ordinance enforcement officer employed by Plaintiff 
conducted an inspection of Foy's property in West Valley City and found it was not in 
compliance with the City Code. 
2. That same day, the ordinance enforcement officer sent a notice of violation to Foy's 
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3. Foy received the notice, as she admitted, but did not respond and did not attempt to 
obtain a notice of compliance by October 30,1997, as required by the notice she received. 
4. The notice of violation stated that Foy could request a hearing within 10 days from the 
date the notice, of violation was issued. The notice also stated that failure to file a written request 
for a hearing within 10 days constituted a waiver of the right to a hearing. ; 
4. Foy did not request a hearing in the allotted time. By failing to request a hearing 
within the designated time, Foy failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. 
6. Foy has failed to show that she should be relieved from the exhaustion of remedies 
rules because she has provided no evidence that a hearing would have been an inadequate remedy 
or that exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the public 
benefit derived from requiring exhaustion. 
7. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Foy failed to exhaust her 
administrative remedies. 
ORDER 
NOW THEREFORE, the Court having made its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of 
Law, and for good cause shown, Orders the following: 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
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